IOGP Europe’s response to the call for evidence on the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)

IOGP Europe welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback to the call for evidence on the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), in the context of its general revision. Overall, we consider that GBER’s objectives and provisions are a good step towards the Union’s targets of promoting growth, simplify State aid rules and prioritization of enforcement on aid with the highest impact on EU Single Market.

The Regulation is also aligned with core EU policy objectives, such as the green transition, the development of R&D, the uptake of private investment and the strengthening of the EU’s competitiveness.

However, this alignment could be enhanced by keeping the GBER up to date with recent policy developments, such as the publication of the Clean Industrial Deal (CID) and the related State Aid Framework (CISAF). Moreover, its effectiveness could be strengthened, and its scope could be expanded to better tackle the competitiveness challenges the EU currently faces in its path towards the Net-Zero target.

IOGP Europe is committed to working in partnership with EU institutions and stakeholders to improve the GBER’s impact and operation, ensuring it makes a meaningful contribution to Europe’s security and climate objectives.

The objectives of the GBER revision

The current GBER does not adequately support the EU’s climate-neutral transition in a comprehensive way. Its scope is
overly restrictive, lacking true technology neutrality and failing to fully recognize the role of low-carbon solutions, together
with that of renewables.

The framework provides only limited funding opportunities for energy and decarbonisation projects. This disproportion becomes clear when compared to the multi-billion costs of renewable energy, hydrogen (both renewable and low-carbon), CCUS, and other innovative low-carbon technology projects. As a result, the effectiveness of the GBER is significantly constrained. This could be enhanced with a tailored revision: an expansion of GBER’s scope and higher aid intensities for
longer periods.

Finally, competitive bidding is – by nature – an efficient and transparent way to ensure proportionality of granted aid and to keep support amounts to the minimum, especially for large projects. Hence, the fulfilment of its conditions should not require additional assessments, funding gap analysis or claw-back mechanisms. This would remove the unnecessary overlaps the current GBER presents, avoiding duplication of assessments, cutting the red tape, providing greater predictability and enhancing effective support for aid beneficiaries.

Recommendations on the objectives of GBER revision.

• Technology neutrality: expand its scope to all relevant decarbonisation technologies, introducing higher aid
intensities for longer periods (up to 15 years for large-scale projects) to effectively de-risk investments in the field.
• Competitive auctions: introduce well-designed competitive bidding mechanisms, coupled with simplification, as
they could lead to optimal fund allocation while reducing administrative burden.

Scope of the GBER (Chapter II)
The scope of the GBER remains too narrow to support the EU’s strategic transition priorities, namely the decarbonisation of industrial sectors while enhancing competitiveness. Several categories of projects central to decarbonisation that meet the block exemption criteria are not currently included in the GBER, or only indirectly addressed (e.g. Net-Zero strategic projects; integrated transition projects combining energy, decarbonisation and training measures). This forces projects into lengthy Climate, Energy and Environmental Aid Guidelines (CEEAG) notifications from Member States, delaying deployment. In parallel, key definitions listed in Article 2 of the GBER (e.g. “renewable energy”) result outdated and not aligned with EU taxonomy (which includes e.g. CCUS), or industrial policy.

Moreover, Article 2(50) of the current GBER defines “initial investment in favour of new economic activity” based on NACE four-digit classifications. This reliance on NACE codes risks excluding genuinely innovative or transformative industrial activities simply because they remain within the same classification, regardless of the underlying R&D, new supply chains or strategic contribution to the EU’s decarbonisation goals. For example, a manufacturer of electric motors for the oil and gas sector (NACE 27.11) wishing to reorient its production towards advanced condensers for grid stability would still fall under the same code and thus not qualify as a “new economic activity.” Such rigidity obstructs the regulation’s intended purpose of supporting diversification and industrial transformation.

Furthermore, the obligation for ex-post evaluation of large aid schemes is also disproportionate: current thresholds capture too many energy and industrial projects, adding bureaucracy without meaningful benefits. A more proportionate
approach would raise thresholds, limit evaluation to long-term or innovative schemes, and treat it as a reporting requirement rather than a (pass/fail) block-exemption condition.
Regarding compatibility conditions, the current “incentive effect” test is too rigid and disconnected from the reality of capital-intensive transition projects because (i) in many cases, even when subsidized, decarbonisation projects do not
ensure adequate return of investment and (ii) investment decisions are usually based on broader considerations (such as “do-nothing” alternatives or the avoided cost of compliance). Moreover, companies often need to carry out preparatory steps to make projects progress – such as feasibility studies, permitting, early procurement or framework agreements – well before Final Investment Decisions (FIDs) are taken. Under the current rules, these steps may be seen as breaching the incentive effect requirement, even though the project would not advance without the aid. In this context, subsidies act more as risk-mitigation measures that accelerate or unlock investments, rather than serving as a simple “go/no-go” trigger. Preparatory works or frozen projects should not be excluded from aid eligibility if subsidies accelerate decarbonisation outcomes or unlock investments.
Likewise, simplified cost options (SCOs) should be expanded. While useful for standardisation, they are currently restricted to EU fund–linked operations. Extending SCOs horizontally to strategic industrial projects, with benchmarks such
as €/MW of electrolysers or €/tonne of CO₂ captured would streamline implementation, reduce compliance burden and ensure coherence with existing EU funding practice.

Finally, providing greater flexibility in the definition of ‘projects’ under the GBER - by recognizing forward-looking effects of aid (e.g. accelerated GHG reduction) and focusing on the actions needed to achieve intended outcomes under given market conditions - would improve legal certainty and relevance. A project should be understood as the necessary set of actions to reach (e.g.) decarbonization outcomes, within a given timeline and available resources – rather than being narrowly defined by its scope.

Recommendations on GBER Chapter II
To enhance the GBER’s effectiveness and catalyse investments in strategic energy and decarbonisation projects, the following potentially eligible categories should be included in the revised Regulation:
– Net-zero Strategic Projects listed in Article 4 of the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA);
– Energy infrastructure and networks;
– Integrated transition projects: multi-objective projects that combine energy, decarbonisation, digitalisation or training measures within one scheme;
– Large-scale decarbonisation of existing industrial assets, beyond improving energy efficiency only;
– Strategic supply chain development for renewable and low-carbon technology components.
• Amend outdated definitions in Article 2 to align them with EU taxonomy and the new EU industrial policy, consistently with EU priorities under the NZIA and the CID.
• Amend Article 2(50) to move beyond NACE four-digit reliance and introduce a more flexible criterion, recognising investments that deliver substantial innovation, decarbonisation benefits, or strategic supply chain shifts even when falling within the same statistical class. Ensure the definition of “initial investment in favour of new economic activity” supports industrial transformation.
• Amend the current “incentive effect” test to include preparatory works and frozen assets in aid eligibility and unlock
investments.
• Expand the use of SCOs beyond EU fund-linked operations, to cover strategic industrial projects.
• Amend the current definition of “projects” to better reflect the concrete steps that lead to project development and its outcomes.

Specific conditions for compatibility (Chapter III)
The current GBER framework is too complex for the scale of industrial transformation required. Rules and definitions (e.g. about Undertakings in Difficulty, incentive effect, start of works, and integrated projects) should be simplified to avoid creating legal uncertainty. Proportionality checks based on funding gap or counterfactual scenarios should remain optional and be replaced wherever possible with fixed aid intensities, competitive bidding, or standardised benchmarks, which provide clarity and efficiency. To unlock strategic investments, the revised GBER should simplify compatibility conditions and ensure technology neutrality across decarbonisation options, to better reflect the realities of large-scale industrial projects. Finally, GBER should allow for an aligned cumulation of aid with the broader EU funding framework (i.e. CISAF), which would provide project developers with more coordinated support.

Recommendations on GBER Chapter III
• Article 1(4) (Undertakings in Difficulty) – Refine the definition to include not structurally distressed start-ups and scale-ups and to not block strategic decarbonisation investments from companies in transition.
• Article 2 (definitions) – Update definitions (e.g. renewable energy, renewable and low-carbon hydrogen, CCUS) to reflect current EU taxonomy.
• Article 6 (incentive effect and start of works) – Clarify that preparatory steps do not invalidate the incentive effect of the aid and allow support for “frozen” projects.
• Article 8 (cumulation rules) – Simplify, update and clarify cumulation rules to allow easier blending of EU, national, and ETS-related funds.
• Article 36.1b (hydrogen) – Remove production-method restrictions: aid should apply to all forms of hydrogen (including low-carbon hydrogen via CCS) if compliant with climate neutrality.
• Article 36.6 (CCUS) – Increase aid intensity threshold from 30% to 60%, aligning CCUS with other eligible technologies and ensuring technology neutrality.

• General provisions:
– Streamline project-specific proportionality checks: use funding gap or claw-back only for very large schemes, not by default.
– Harmonise sectoral exclusions to ensure horizontal measures (R&D, digitalisation, renewables) are consistently open across sectors.
– Better align the GBER with conditions, eligibility criteria and eligible categories laid down by other EU support schemes and funds, such as the Innovation Fund, the Recovery and Resilience Facility or HorizonEurope. These programmes often have broader eligible categories than GBER or their rules diverge, creating inconsistencies.

IOGP Europe stands ready to work with the European Commission and Member States to ensure that the revised GBER becomes a more effective tool for Europe’s twin transition.

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